After observing a collision between two boxes, you can immediately tell which is empty and which is full of books based on how the boxes moved. People form rich perceptions about the physical properties of objects from their interactions, an ability that plays a crucial role in learning about the physical world through our experiences. Here, we present three experiments that demonstrate people's capacity to reason about the relative masses of objects in naturalistic 3D scenes. We find that people make accurate inferences, and that they continue to fine-tune their beliefs over time. To explain our results, we propose a cognitive model that combines Bayesian inference with approximate knowledge of Newtonian physics by estimating probabilities from noisy physical simulations. We find that this model accurately predicts judgments from our experiments, suggesting that the same simulation mechanism underlies both peoples' predictions and inferences about the physical world around them.
Introduction
Consider the scene in Fig. 1a . Despite the difference in size, one can infer that the mass of the forklift is large compared to that of the storage container. Inferences about the physical properties of objects such as mass and friction are critical to how we understand and interact with our surroundings. While they are sometimes specified unambiguously by a small set of perceptible features such as size, material, or tactile sensations, we often access them only indirectly via their physical influence on observable objects. Here, we ask: how do people make such inferences about the unobservable physical attributes of objects from complex scenes and events?
In addition to one-off inferences about properties such as mass, people form beliefs about these properties over time. For example, through experience, people learn that certain materials (e.g., metal) are heavier than others (e.g., plastic). How is it that people learn these attributes? Certainly, people may rely on sensorimotor feedback as they hold and manipulate objects (e.g. Baugh, Kao, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2012) . Can people also learn through experience if only visual information about the static and dynamic behavior of such objects is available? If so, what is the mechanism by which they do this?
There is a vast literature on whether (and if so, how) people reason about mass. People are clearly sensitive to mass when reasoning about other physical properties: for example, people's memory for the location of an object is affected by its implied weight (Hubbard, 1997); similarly, people make different judgments about how a tower of blocks will fall down depending on which blocks they think are heavier (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013) . Previous studies of how humans infer mass from observed collision dynamics have examined the relative roles of perceptual invariants (Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000) and heuristics (Gilden & Proffitt, 1994; Todd & Warren, 1982) , focusing on judgments about simple one-or two-dimensional (1D or 2D) situations with one or two objects. However, the real world is much more complex: everyday scenes are three-dimensional (3D) and often involve many objects.
1 Moreover, collisions between objects are not the only factor affecting peoples' judgments: for example, there are no collisions in the forklift scene in Fig. 1a , yet we can easily infer what the relative masses of the objects might be. A question related to whether people can make accurate inferences about unobservable physical properties is how they make any inferences at all. Sanborn, Mansinghka, and Griffiths (2009, 2013) proposed that inferences could be characterized by a model that performs Bayesian inference over structured knowledge of http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.012 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
